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Abstract 
 
Russia defines itself as a great power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the 
article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary 
European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a 
Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with 
Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that 
Russia’s superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the 
formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority 
complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as 
a great power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain 
that status. The costs of maintaining great-power status without radical political and economic 
change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about-turn is 
needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything 
about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, , then the Russian cyclical shifting 
from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Russia’s Europe, 1991-2016: Inferiority to Superiority1 
 
As the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia opted for a foreign policy of cooperation with the 
Europe and the West. In 2014, having occupied the Crimean Peninsula, it aided and abetted 
an insurgency against the central authorities in neighbouring Ukraine. In 2015, it left the 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and began a military build-up along its entire 
Western border. In 2016, it came to the aid of its ally Syria in a way that brought it directly 
into conflict with Western powers. The last 25 years has seen an about-turn from cooperation 
to conflict. 
 
There are a number of ways of accounting for such sea changes in foreign policy. Some 
studies set out to explain Russia’s foreign policy by analyzing Russia’s place in the 
international system, most often geopolitical in nature.2 Clearly, one reason for Russia’s 
about-turn is the state’s difficulty in dealing with the downsizing in territory and resources 
that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the more marginalized place within the 
states system in which that put Russia. Other studies aim to demonstrate how Russian foreign 
policy is determined by structural domestic changes such as bureaucratic infighting, the 
                                            
1 I thank Amanda Cellini, Minda Holm and Sophie Meislin for assistance and my reviewers for 
comments. Part of the funding for this article was provided by the Norwegian Research Council 
under the project ‘Undermining Hegemony’, project no. 240647. 
2 A typical example would be John J. Mearsheimer ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: 
The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’ Foreign Affairs: September/October 2014, which 
reaches this conclusion by deducing from the premises set out in his The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York: Norton, 2002) with admirable logic and clarity. See also Michael Wigell and 
Antto Vihma  
‘Geopolitics versus geoeconomics: the case of Russia’s geostrategy and its effects on the EU’, 
International Affairs 92: 3 (2016); Sten Rynning ‘The false premise of continental concert: Russia, 
the West and the necessary balance of power’, International Affairs 91: 3, 2015. 
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motives of political leaders and so on.3 Once again, such factors are always important in order 
to understand how specific foreign policy decisions come about. A third literature traces the 
influence of ideas.4 Given that actions depend on how people think about the world, such 
studies also help our understanding of radical change. Ideas were important to the rise of the 
Soviet Union, they were important to its downfall, and they remain important. And yet, the 
approach to the problem of Russia’s changing European policy taken here is different. I start 
from the presupposition that societies and their states seek recognition in the world, and that 
states somehow have to relate to society’s views of the grounds on which a country should 
seek recognition.5 These grounds will be contested, and my first concern in this article is to 
map this contestation as it has unfolded over the last quarter century.  
 
                                            
3 Readers of International Affairs have been excellently suited in this regard; for recent examples, 
see Roy Allison, ‘Russian “deniable intervention” in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules’ 
90: 6 (2014); David Wedgewood Benn, ‘On re-examining western attitudes to Russia’ 90: 6,2014; 
Andrew Monaghan, ‘Putin's Russia: shaping a grand strategy?’, 89: 5 (2013); Arkady Moishes, 
‘Russia's European policy under Medvedev: how sustainable is a new compromise?’ 88: 1, 2012.  
4 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ 
International Organization, 46: 2, 1992; Stefan Auer ‘Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: the Ukraine 
crisis and the return of geopolitics’, International Affairs 91: 5, 2015.  
5 There are a number of approaches that pursued this broad programme, and they may all be 
traced back to Hegel. For an overview, see Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in 
European Identity Formation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); also 
Sergei Prozorov 'In and Out of Europe: Identity Politics in Russian-European Relations' in Eiki 
Berg and Piret Ehin (eds) Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European 
Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009): 133-159; Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili 'The 
External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers' Cooperation 
and Conflict 47, 1 (2012): 28-48.. One strand that is particularly productive regarding Russian 
studies is Social Identification Theory, which postulates that when an agent cannot find 
recognition on a certain set of grounds, it will simply shift the ground for comparison. For an 
excellent example of this approach, see Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Shortcut 
to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy’, International 
Organization 57: 1, 2003. 
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Where Russia is concerned, it has from its very emergence sought not only to be recognized, 
but to be recognized as a great power.6 I have followed the Russian debate about Europe since 
Soviet times, and I have yet to come across a participant that has argued in favour of a policy 
that would give up on this foreign policy goal. It is a given in the debate that Russia should be 
great. This observation underlies the entire argument to be developed in the article.  
 
The argument turns on what it means for Russians that their country should be ‘great’. I trace 
how, following Michael Gorbachev’s easing of censorship as part of his perestroika politics of 
the late 1980s, two ways of thinking about Russian greatness have clashed. 1991 was the 
heyday of Russia’s turn to Europe. The state, and also a whole string of public voices, wanted 
Russia to be ‘a normal nation state’, by which was meant a standard liberal democratic and 
capitalist European country. Against this westernizing or liberal representation of Europe 
stood what was at first a makeshift group of old communists and right-wing nationalists, who 
put forward an alternative representation which began to form around the idea that the 
quintessential Russian trait was to have a strong state. The article traces how this latter 
position consolidated into a fully-fledged xenophobic nationalist representation of Europe. I 
use the term xenophobic to stress how this strand of nationalism goes beyond a spiritual or 
patriotic celebration of Self by explicitly adding hostile tropes when discussing all or select 
                                            
6 Anatoliy Reshetnikov, Russia as a great power, Ph.D thesis (Central European University, forthcoming); Iver 
B. Neumann, ‘Russia’s standing as a great power, 1492-1815’ in Ted Hopf, ed., Russia’s European Choices 
(New York, NY: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 11-34; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Russia as a great power, 1815-2007’, Journal of 
International Relations and Development 11: 2,2008, pp. 128-151; Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian foreign 
policy: the return of great power politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p. 153. 
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minorities and outside polities.7 During the Putin years, this xenophobic nationalist position 
steadfastly gained ground by largely incorporating another version of nationalism of long 
standing in Russia, namely spiritual nationalism. In response to the shift in societal debate 
traced here, but also to factors such as developments in Ukraine and rumblings of discontent 
amongst liberals in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Russian state went on to adopt a 
xenophobic nationalist position from 2013 onwards. The official Russian stance is now that 
Russia itself is True Europe, a conservative great power that guards Europe’s true Christian 
heritage against the False Europe of decadence and depravity to its West. If Russia had an 
inferiority complex towards Europe in 1991, a quarter century down the road, that complex 
has been inverted into a superiority complex.  
 
The stories that a country tells about itself and others do not determine foreign policy directly. 
Any foreign policy action springs from a number of sources. And yet, it seems clear that the 
repertoire of actions that lie close to hand regarding a partner in cooperation differs from 
those regarding an outright adversary. It is, as a Russian would say, no coincidence that, in the 
1990s, dominant social stories of Europe as an ideal that Russia would increase its greatness 
by following went hand in hand with a foreign policy of cooperation. By the same token, it is 
hardly surprising that today’s dominant stories of how Russia is superior to Europe coincided 
with a policy of confrontation. 
 
                                            
7 Other terms, like fundamentalist nationalists, have also been used about this group, see Margot 
Light (2003) ‘In search of an identity: Russian foreign policy and the end of ideology’, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, 2003. 
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The about-turn in Russia’s approach to Europe over the last 25 years has precedents. In the 
wake of the Napoleonic Wars, stories of how Russia was superior to liberal Europe crowded 
out stories of how Russia should aim to emulate Europe. After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean 
War, it happened again, and then yet again at the end of the 19th century. Stalin’s turn away 
from European Marxism in favour of building socialism in one country presents itself as a 
new variant of the same basic theme. If my first concern in this article is to trace the about-
face, my second concern is to argue that this about-turn fits a cyclical pattern in Russian 
history, where periods when Russian stories about Europe as something to emulate give way 
to periods where stories about European decadence and rottenness take over. This cycle seems 
to be driven by Russia’s continuing backwardness relative to Europe in producing economic 
and political orders. If Russia had existed in splendid isolation, this would not have mattered. 
However, the states system is a self-help system where powers that do not produce enough to 
keep up with the leading powers are invariably marginalized. It follows that any power which 
wants to be recognised as great has to have an economic and political base that can sustain 
that claim. Two conclusions may be drawn. First, Russia’s present superiority complex will 
yet again change into an inferiority complex further on down the line. Secondly, as long as the 
country does not succeed in either emulating Europe and the West or in coming up with an 
equally effective and so competitive social order, Russia’s backwardness-driven cycle of 
telling stories about Europe is bound to continue.  
 
The 1990s 
 
Gorbachev’s Perestroyka rekindled old Russian debates about Europe. The old Communist story 
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of how Europe represented a past that the Soviet Union had left behind, was no longer 
sustainable. In its place came a dominating state narrative about how Russia had to ‘rejoin 
civilisation’ in order to sustain its greatness, but also a very different story about how Russia 
should sustain its greatness by being true to one of the ideals shared by the tsarist and Soviet 
regimes both, namely that Russian greatness lay in rallying a state that could act swiftly, 
ruthlessly and decisively. In August 1991, the coup against Gorbachev was propelled by this 
story, and its was among other things this story that President Yeltsin attacked when he stormed 
the Congress of People's Deputies in October 1993. After Yeltsin used armed force against his 
own Parliament, the debate slowed down and became more of a war of position between liberals 
on the one hand and spiritual romantic nationalists on the other, with a xenophobic nationalist 
position building up in the wings.  
 
The declaration of the August 1991 coup leaders is, therefore, a good place to start the analysis. 
It drew significantly on a xenophobic romantic nationalist text published a month earlier under 
the heading 'A word to the people':8  
 
 A great, unheard of disaster is happening. Our MOTHERLAND, our soil, the great state 
that history, nature and our renowned forefathers have trusted us with, is going under, is 
being destroyed, is descending into darkness and nothingness [...Shall we let the 
                                            
    8 'A word to the people', Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 July 1991. The article was signed by Yuriy Bondarev and, in 
Cyrillic alphabetical order, Yuriy Blokhin, Valentin Varennikov, Eduard Volodin, Boris Gromov, Gennadiy 
Zyuganov, Lyudmila Zykina, Vyacheslav Klykov, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Valentin Rasputin, Vassiliy Starodubtsev 
and Aleksandr Tisyakov. On the basis of textual analysis, Bondarev, Prokhanov and Rasputin have been mentioned 
as authors; however, Prokhanov has suggested that he himself penned most of it. See Magnus Ljunggren, 'Rysslands 
rödbruna författare', Internationelle Studier 2, 1992, pp. 15-23, especially at p. 17. 
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betrayers and criminals] take away our past, cut us off from the future and leave us 
pitifully to vegetate in the slavery and downtroddeness of our almighty neighbors? 
 
Addressing the army and sundry other institutions and groups, they asked how it was that 'those 
who do not love their country, those who lovingly serve their foreign masters' were allowed to go 
on ruining and breaking up the country, leading it into a second civil war. The document, the 
main author of which was Aleksandr Prokhanov, since December 1990 the founder editor of the 
National Bolshevik newspaper Den’, was signed not only by xenophobic nationalists, but also by 
key former communists and spiritual romantic nationalists. A united nationalist story was 
forming around a key common element: that the Russian state had to be strong -- not only in the 
sense that it would command and be obeyed, but also in the sense that it should be the only real 
power in Russia, and a great power in the world. For good reasons, this position was, and still is, 
often referred to as a statist one. Statists may be found either towards the right or the left – that is 
simply a tactical question of which political and economic models that are preferred in order to 
reach the strategic goal of a strong state. Since what is meant is a centralized apparatus (vertikal) 
that is keenly surveilling and directly disciplining the subjects, statists differ as to how strong is 
strong enough.  
 
From the very start, the statist story about Europe stressed Russia’s superiority. As Prokhanov, a 
self-declared 'traditional imperialist and statist' put it, Europe ‘is a fake machine, a stupid one, 
created by great Germany, with its motivation embedded in history’.9 Prokhanov's solution for 
Russia was to impose 'authoritarianism, which will make it possible to begin to stabilize chaos, 
                                            
9 Literaturnaya gazeta, 2 September 1992. 
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blood and insanity, and then, through strong authoritarian power, the cultivation of democracy 
will slowly begin, not through the creation of insane parliaments, but corporative democratism.' 
When his interlocutor protested that this was the program of Mussolini, Prokhanov shot back that 
it certainly was the program of Mussolini and also of Pinochet, but that 'Mussolini did not have 
the possibility of reaching democracy because it all ended too quickly'. The statist position’s 
affinity with inter-war Fascism was made explicit from the very start. 
 
In 1991-1992, the statist story was just one of a number of nationalist stories that challenged the 
liberal one.  Before long, however, the statist story was to incorporate other nationalist stories 
and consolidate into a fully-fledged story not only of Russia’s spiritual greatness , but also of 
Europe’s spiritual weakness. Eventually, this story would crowd out the liberal story how 
Russia’s greatness lay in cooperation with an economically more advanced Europe. 
 
The direct target of the statist story was the liberal story that emanated from the state itself. The 
Russian state that succeeded the Soviet Union adopted a liberal position, stressing individual 
rights and state predictability, as its own.10 Already in his previous incarnation as the Foreign 
Minister of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, Andrey Kozyrev had pushed the 
line that Russia should join the community of civilized countries and learn from the great powers 
of Europe. This story was a story of Russian inferiority, for the learner is by definition inferior to 
                                            
10 Liberals tend to think of state strength in terms of the ability to get a maximum of things done 
with a minimum of force, which is a very different way of thinking about state strength. Since 
this tradition is strong in Europe, and since it is at the heart of what it means for a state or power 
to be great, the question of what makes a state strong is at the heart of Russian-European 
relations; see Iver B. Neumann, ‘Status is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians 
Seek Great-Power Status’, in T.V. Paul, Deborah Larson & William Wohlforth (eds.) Status and 
World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2014) pp. 85-114 Press. 
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teacher in the areas were they interact in those capacities. The liberal story of how Russia had to 
rejoin a civilization it had presumably left was therefore directly incompatible with the basic 
premise of that Russia should be a great power. Consequently, the idea of a Russian 'return to 
civilization' quickly lost the tug-of-war over the state's position on its relationship with Europe. 
This became evident already in January 1993, when Yeltsin remarked that ‘Russia's independent 
foreign policy started with the West’ but that it was now time to ‘build relations with any 
country, be it from the West or East, Europe, or Asia’.11 Given this new state of play, Kozyrev 
turned to face liberalism’s much more fundamental opponents, namely nationalists. He found 
that, with no convincing story of Russian greatness to tell, statists forced the government to shift 
its position away from the liberal and further towards the nationalist. 1993 saw nothing less than 
an armed confrontation over the issue. Communists and nationalists had joined hands in a 
National Salvation Front, often referred to as the red-browns, and ensconced themselves in the 
Congress of People's Deputies, first politically, then physically. Yeltsin took it upon himself to 
clear out parliament by armed force in October 1993. Once again, the state resorted to violence 
in order to redefine public political space, shooting dead a number of parliamentarians in their 
offices and meeting rooms, banning newspapers and censoring others. 'There will be no more 
leniency to communist-fascism in Russia', Yeltsin concluded in his TV speech to the nation on 6 
October. And if the clash itself was part and parcel of the Russian debate about Europe, so were 
the reasons the state gave for the crackdown. After the October events, Yeltsin's press spokesman 
Vyacheslav Kostikov referred to European ideals in order to justify the state's actions.12  
                                            
11 As quoted in Suzanne Crow, The making of foreign policy in Russia under Yeltsin (Munich: Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1993), p. 76. 
12 Rossiyskie vesti, 19 October 1993. Note the key slide away from an understanding of a strong state as one that 
gets things done with a minimum show of force to one that acts forcefully and directly here. 
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This setback notwithstanding, helped by the results of the parliamentary election in December 
1993, where statist candidates took almost half the votes cast for candidates to the Duma or 
lower house, nationalism came bouncing back much as it had after the attempted coup two years 
before. The state in Russia under Yeltsin simply was not effective enough in bringing about the 
needed stable configuration of political space. The enthusiasm about Europe as a model which 
characterized the state's position upon Yeltsin's coming to power, had clearly dissipated at the 
end of 1993, leaving an insistence on partnership on equal terms.13 The struggle between liberal 
and  statist positions continued unabated. Statists and nationalists of all stripes were on the 
offensive, and the state adjusted its position accordingly. From the mid-1990s onwards, top state 
officials increasingly stressed Russia’s Eurasian character. When Evgeny Primakov became 
Foreign Minister (1996-1998), he made it his main task to do away with a Western-oriented 
policy in favor of a multipolar orientation.14  ‘Europe’ was backgrounded in favour of ‘Eurasia’. 
Not only was Europe’s superiority gone, so was its privileged partner status. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, various statist and nationalist stories about Russia’s greatness 
began to come together in an overarching story. The dovetailing of stories was partially the result 
of collaboration between different groups of nationalists. As an example of how this process 
worked and still works, I turn to the well-documented case of the nationalist entrepreneur 
Alexander Dugin, not necessarily because he himself is particularly influential where foreign 
                                            
13 Anne L. Clunan, The social construction of Russia’s resurgence: aspirations, identity, and security interests 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 60-72. 
14 Christian Thorun, Explaining change in Russian foreign policy: the role of ideas in post-Soviet Russia’s 
conduct towards the west (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 31-41. 
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policy making is concerned, but because his work in making disparate groups and ideas come 
together is symptomatic of the streamlining of statist and nationalist stories into the overarching 
xenophobic nationalist story about Russian superiority vis-à-vis Europe that went on to 
marginalize the liberal story. 
 
The list of Dugin’s collaborators down the years reads like a who’s who of xenophobic 
nationalists in Russia. He joined Pamyat’ as a 25-year-old in 1988. He worked with Prokhanov 
on the newspaper Den’ (from 1993, Zavtra), the key press organ of the xenophobic nationalists 
to this day. He worked closely not only with Prokhanov and his friends at the High Command, 
but also with the leader of the revamped Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, to the point 
where Shenfield found that he ‘probably played a significant part in formulating the nationalist 
communist ideology that was Zyuganov’s hallmark’.15 Dugin translated European fascists, re-
published Russian Eurasianists from the inter-war period and, most importantly for the Russian 
debate about Europe, wrote a string of monographs. The basic one in order to understand his 
view of Europe is also his major work, Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia’s Geopolitical 
Future.16 
 
Dugin’s protagonists are masses, leaders, and topography. Except for leaders and the thinkers 
who provide them with operational schemes, or theory as Dugin calls it, individuals as such have 
no place in politics. The basic confrontation is between Land and Sea. Eurasia is Land; the 
United States and the United Kingdom are Sea. Civilizations, or super-ethnicities, are the key 
                                            
15 Stephen Shenfield, Russian fascism: traditions, tendencies, movements (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 
192. 
16 Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee rossii (Moscow: Arktogeya, [1997] 1999).  
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political entities. Like all ethnic groups, they mystically emerge out of the soil and, equally 
mystically, exude a quality that Dugin, following the Eurasianist Lev Gumilev, calls 
passionarity. Gumilev defined passionarity as the process whereby organisms absorb 
biochemical energy from nature,17 but behind this mystical view, what seems to be denoted is 
something like realized collective will. Note the voluntarist focus here. Dugin resembles interwar 
geopoliticians like Rudolf Kjellén in treating polities as organic entities, but he is much more 
insistent than they were on the importance of will and, by the same token, on the irrelevance of 
material resources. 
 
For Dugin, the Land, or Heartland, is Eurasia. It is a civilization, a super-ethnos. It follows that 
Land’s basic enemy – it is important to have enemies -- is Sea and its ideological guise, which is 
Atlanticism. The Sea, that is United States and Atlanticism, conspired to execute the Soviet 
Union.18 The historical task ahead of Russia at the present juncture is, consequently, to gather all 
of the Eurasian Heartland around the messianic Russian state and mobilize for a war on the 
United States and Atlanticism. This is in keeping with Russia’s historical destiny, for Russia’s 
passionarity remains high. Russia’s destiny is therefore to build a giant state or empire out of 
Eurasia. To Dugin, such an empire will be a grander Soviet Union.19  
                                            
17 Marlène Laruelle, ‘Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian version of the European radical right?’ (2008), p. 68, 
http://www.4pt.su/en/content/aleksadr-dugin-russian-version-european-radical-right, accessed 1 March 2016. 
18 Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 367. 
19 Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 251-253. One objection to calling Eurasianism xenophobic would be that they 
celebrate political community where ethnic nationalists condemn it. This is a weak objection, though, for 
Eurasianism is an imperial ideology, where other ethnic groups are only celebrated as underlings to Russian 
masters. In other capacities, they are viewed as hostiles. Just like French and English nationalism and racism 
were key to understanding the French and English empires, so Russian nationalism is key to understanding 
contemporary Russian imperialism. I disagree with the state-of-the-art volume on Russian nationalism when it 
states programmatically that nationalism was “[p]reviously dominated by ‘imperial’ tendencies” but is “now 
focusing more and more on ethnic issues” (see Pål Kolstø, ‘The ethnification of Russian nationalism’ in Pål 
Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud eds., The New Russian nationalism: imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 
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As pointed out by Andrei Tsygankov, Dugin’s is a ‘discourse of war’.20 Dugin’s celebration 
of having enemies and of waging war on them, his celebration of the strong-man model for 
politics, his anti-Semitism, his religious mysticism which co-habits with his techno-optimism, 
his railing against American consumerism and materialism, his backing of an anti-
enlightenment conservative revolution, his explicit building on European fascist thinkers such 
as Julius Evola (1898-1974) and Jean Thiriart (1922-1992), and also his contacts with the 
extreme right in France, Greece, Serbia and elsewhere,21 have led many observers to classify 
him as a fascist.22 (Umland 2008) This is warranted, and in fact Dugin himself embraces 
fascism. The name he chose for the party he launched in 1993 was the National Bolsheviks, a 
name that historically specifically denotes communist-fascist collaboration. The main point 
where views on Europe is concerned, however, is that Dugin stands in a solid fascist tradition 
that puts stock not only in fervent nationalism on behalf of one state, but also in the building 
of a fascist Europe. Fascist all-European movements thrived all through the inter-war period. 
The alliance between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany lasted until Mussolini’s fall from 
power. In most if not all inter-war European parties, there was a key ideological debate 
between those who would draw the line of the nation according to spoken language (say, High 
German) and those who would draw it around a wider cultural community (say, pan-
Germanism or Eurasianism). The latter built a fairly strong international fascist movement. 
                                                                                                                                        
2000-15 [Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 1), for it is not the case historically that states and 
empires are discrete phenomena, and I do not think Eurasianists and other imperially oriented contemporary 
Russian tendencies are free of ethnic thinking. 
20 Andrei Tsygankov, ‘Hard-line Eurasianists and Russia’s contending geopolitical perspectives’, East European 
Quarterly 32: 3 (1998), p. 329. 
21 Laruelle, ‘Aleksandr Dugan’ 
22 Dunlop, ‘Aleksandr Dugan’s foundations’; Andreas Umland, Theorizing post-Soviet Russia’s extreme right: 
comparative political, historical and sociological approaches (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008).  
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Dugin and his neo-Eurasianist movement is heir to the latter tradition. The neo-Eurasianist or 
xenophobic nationalist position in Russian discourse, as resuscitated by Dugin and associates, 
also rests firmly on the Russian xenophobic nationalist position as it evolved during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. As an even more 
distant anchor, Dugin alludes to the state’s position of official nationalism as it looked from 
1833 onwards, by stressing how Russian nationalism is a question of narodnost’ (people-
mindedness) and pravoslavie (orthodoxy).23 Recall that the third concept of the official 
nationalism of the Russian empire as defined 190 years ago was samoderzhavie – autocracy. 
Dugin’s embrace of the strong leader in general, and, as we shall see, of Putin in particular, in 
effect means that today’s xenophobic nationalist representation puts itself forward as an heir 
not only to Gumilev and older Eurasians, but also to the Pan-Slavic nationalism of the late 
nineteenth century and the official nationalism of the early nineteenth century.  
 
To Western readers who are unfamiliar with European interwar fascist thinking and the 
Russian tradition, Dugin may sound idiosyncratic. That would be a weak reading. I suggest 
that we rather think of Dugin and today’s xenophobic nationalist representation of the enemy 
as the last instalment of Russian anti-modern thinking about Europe. Europe has become a 
False, Americanized Europe that has to be rid of its consumerism and Atlanticism in order to 
re-emerge as a true Europe under Russian suzerainty.24 Dugin’s line, that Russia is true 
                                            
23 Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 255. The doctrine was hatched by then Minister of Education, Count Uvarov, in 
response to what was seen as the threat of home-grown liberalism; see Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 25-26. 
24 Inspired by Dostoevsky, I introduced the term in Russia and the Idea of Europe, whence, as noted by 
Viacheslav Morozov, ‘V poiskakh Evropy: possiyskiy politicheskiy diskurs i okruzhayushchiy mir’, 
Neprikosnovennyy zapas 4, 30: 1-7 (2003), it founds its way back to the Russian debate itself. See also: Dmitry 
Shlapentokh, ‘The great friendship: geopolitical fantasies about the Russia/Europe lliance in the early Putin era 
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Europe because it has remained true to pre-enlightenment and pre-modern values, is firmly 
rooted in Russian Messianic tradition. It also succeeded in telling a story of Russia and its 
relationship with Europe that brought seeming continuity to the three periods of tsarist, Soviet 
and Putin rule, under the rubric of ‘strong state’. Given that history is the chronological aspect 
of a polity’s identity, such a national narrative is potentially productive, and not only 
nostalgic, and so highly potent political stuff. This became increasingly clear in the 2000s, as 
the political debate as such became ever more stylized, even frozen, and the xenophobic 
nationalist position came ever more to the fore.  
 
Putin’s Russia  
 
The 2000s saw the return of a political landscape dominated by a strong leader – President 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Following the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 
September 2001, there was an opening to the West. This was also a time when Putin’s 
immediate entourage included staunch liberals like Andrey Illarionov. Still, the key 
development of the new millennium so far has been a further weakening of the westernizing 
representation towards an overhauled and consolidated nationalist representation, and the 
state’s embrace of the latter position in President Putin’s third election period (2012-2018).  
 
                                                                                                                                        
(2000-2008) – the case of Alexander Dugin’, Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 22: 1 
(2014), p. 58. 
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In the autumn of 1999, when Putin was Prime Minister, the Russian MFA published a 
‘Medium-Term Strategy for the Russian Federation’s Development of Relations with the 
European Union (2000-2010)’, where the EU was named Russia’s strategic partner.25 The EU 
was not Russia’s sole partner – Primakov’s policy of multipolarity had done away with that – 
and it was no longer an entity to be emulated as a matter of course, but one of many entities 
with which Russia had to interact. The state took up a position between a liberal 
representation of Europe and a nationalist one, but closer to the former.  
 
On the eve of the new Millennium, Putin published an article to the nation which presented a 
broad overview of Russia’s place in the world. The distinctive ambiguity of the 1990s 
between seeing Europe as something else and as something to be emulated in one respect or 
the other, dominated the article, which is worth quoting at length: 
 
The main thing is that Soviet power did not let the country develop a flourishing society 
which could be developing dynamically, with free people. First and foremost, the 
ideological approach to the economy made our country lag increasingly behind 
(otstavanie) the developed states. It is bitter to admit that for almost seven decades we 
travelled down a blind alley, which took us away from the main track of civilization 
[…] The experience of the 1990s vividly shows that […t]he mechanical copying of the 
experiences of other states will not bring progress. […] Russia will not soon, if ever, be 
a replica of, say, the US or Great Britain, where liberal values have deep-seated 
                                            
25 Mankoff, ‘Russian foreign policy’, p. 153. 
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traditions. For us, the state, with its institutions and structures, always played an 
exclusively important role in the life of the country and its people. For the Russian 
(rossiyanin), a strong state is not an anomaly, not something with which he has to 
struggle, but, on the contrary, a source of and a guarantee for order, as well as the 
initiator and main moving force of any change. Contemporary Russian society does not 
mistake a strong and effective state for a totalitarian one.26 
 
This is the typical positioning of a politician: there is a nod to the liberal representation -- Europe 
constitutes ‘the main track of civilization -- and there a nod in the xenophobic nationalist 
representation – Russia must have a strong state and its own path. By the same token, throughout 
the 2000s, Putin took turns insisting that Russia was a European power, and also a Eurasian 
one.27 The most striking thing about this speech, however, is that the head of state speaks 
about the state he rules as having a discontinuous history. A polity – any polity – must by 
definition have some we-ness that is shared, at least by its elite. We-ness must indicate that a 
number of relevant identities are all tied together in the concept of a we with some degree of 
permanence in time and space. It runs against this root metaphor of a polity’s unity in time to 
see former instantiations of the polity as bad.28 When it nonetheless happens, as it did in 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s Millennium article, it is evident that there is a 
problem, and that resources will be used to address that problem. In other words, we should 
                                            
26 Vladimir Putin, 'Rossiya na Rubezhe Tysyacheletii', Nezavisimaiia Gazeta, 30 Dec 1999, 
http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html, accessed 12 Dec 2015. 
27 Thorun, Explaining change, p. 35 et passim argues that top state personnel emphasized Eurasia less when 
Putin came to power, but produces no evidence to prop up the claim. See also Dunlop, ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s 
Foundations’. 
28 A major exception g is post-Second World War Germany; seeOle Wæver,  ‘European Security Identities’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1), 1996: 103-132. 
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expect discursive change. And indeed, change appeared fairly quickly. By 2005, at the 
beginning of his second Presidential period, Putin’s representation of Russia’s relationship to 
Europe had evolved and gained temporal cohesion. For example, in his recent ‘Annual 
Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, he stressed how ‘above all else 
Russia is ‘a major European power’ which had for three centuries, passed hand in hand with 
other European countries  
 
through reforms of Enlightenment, the difficulties of emerging parliamentarianism, 
municipal and judiciary branches, and the establishment of similar legal systems. Step 
by step, we moved together towards recognizing and extending human rights, toward 
universal and equal suffrage, toward understanding the need to look after the weak and 
the impoverished, towards women’s emancipation, and other social gains. I repeat we 
did this together, sometimes behind and sometimes ahead of European standards.29 
 
Suddenly, Russia no longer has a discontinuous history. Its history is rather like a continuous, as 
opposed to a discontinuous, march, it happens ‘step by step’. A key phrase where Europe is 
concerned is ‘we moved together’; Russia and Europe emerge on parallel tracks. Note, 
furthermore, that where, in 1999, Putin stressed how Russia has a history of ‘lagging behind’ 
Europe, by 2005, Russia and Europe are more like two marchers taking turns in being the field’s 
hare. In only five years, the representation of centuries Russian-European relations has been 
thoroughly rearranged. In his famous Munich speech, Putin ended by wryly noting how 
                                            
29 Vladimir Putin, ‘Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobranyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (2005), www.kremlin.ru, accessed 8 
Jan 2016; Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Finding a civilizational idea: “west”, “Eurasia”, and “Euro-east” in Russia’s 
foreign policy’, Geopolitics 12: 3, 2007, p. 385. 
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European exhortations for Russia to active role in world affairs were hardly necessary, given that 
‘Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically 
always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy’.30 
 
Russia, a cover term for a temporal and discontinuous string of different polities, has not only 
become an entity with unity across an entire millennium, but also one which has always had a 
coherent foreign policy. As one would expect from a leader that aims to incarnate the state 
that he leads, Putin’s speeches evolve at the same pace as the Russian debate at large. In 2003, 
one of the leading self-proclaimed westernizers in Russia, Anatoly Chubays, had stated that 
Russia’s destiny was to be an empire, but it should be a liberal empire. This was something 
new for the period, for the wish to see of Russia as a ‘normal country’ – read, a European-
style nation state – had been a constitutive element of a westernizing representation, 
articulated in direct opposition to the nationalist idea that Russia had always been and should 
always be an exceptional and imperial great power. The westernizing representation was, in 
other words, eking closer to the nationalist position. This was indicative of how the band-
width of the Russian debate about Europe shrunk. A second characteristic of the westernizing 
or liberal position of the period was its failure to produce any new elements that could have 
compensated for the moving closer to nationalism and set it firmly apart from it.  
 
                                            
30 Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 
10, 2007’, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.sht
ml, accessed 26 Feb 2016. 
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There is, however, a crucial exception to this, and it has to do with statements and actions that 
demand free elections. Particularly after the 2008 Presidential elections, Moscow and St. 
Petersburg saw demonstrations and rallies featuring a broad range of self-proclaimed 
oppositional figures, but dominated by liberals. State officials repeatedly compared these 
activities to the run-up to the so-called color revolutions in the former Soviet Union, 
particularly to the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004, which ushered in a liberal 
President. On 6 May 2012, during a mass demonstration in Bolotnaya Square, Moscow, the 
state decided to put a stop to these activities and staged a crack-down.31 Long prison 
sentences were doled out. Almost four years later, more than two dozen people are still in 
prison, waiting for their sentences. Snetkov has suggested that this movement took over from 
terrorists as the perceived number one threat to the regime and internal security, and that the 
demonstrations were crucial in pushing the state further towards a nationalist position on 
Europe.32 
 
The state also took action against outspoken nationalists, though. A special operations 
colonel, Vladimir Kvachkov, who held that Russia was occupied by a Jewish-Masonic 
conspiracy, served a three-year prison sentence for an attempt at leading liberal Anatoly 
Chubays’s life in 2005. Furthermore, the state broke up a number of nationalist 
demonstrations, including so-called Russian Marches. The kind of all-round state policing of 
the debate on display here is not only fully in keeping with Russian traditions. It is also in 
                                            
31 Samuel Greene, ‘Beyond Bolotnaia: bridging old and new in Russia's election protest 
movement’, Problems of Post-Communism 60: 2, 2013, pp. 40-52 
32 Aglaya Snetkov, ‘When the internal and external collide: a social constructivist reading of Russia’s security 
policy’, Europe-Asia Studies 64: 3, p. 534. 
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keeping with a general Weberian view of the state as the institution that aims to stand as it 
were above clashing social forces in order to maintain societal order. The thing to note, I 
think, is that state policing did obviously favour either liberals or nationalists. The steady shift 
in the balance between the two cannot be ascribed to state intervention alone, but must be 
ascribed to the growing appeal of the xenophobic nationalist representation. 
 
The xenophobic nationalist representation remained dynamic in at least three senses. Firstly, it 
continued to gain ground in the overall debate, forcing some Westernizers to adopt some of its 
elements in order not to be marginalized as the center of the debate shifted closer to 
nationalism. Secondly, it continued to subsume spiritual nationalists, so that it remained the 
stronger of only two major representations, as opposed to three. Thirdly, it was able to spawn 
elements that appeared to be new. I write ‘appear’, for the two most important elements were 
not historically new, but rather regurgitated from older and by now half-forgotten Russian 
representations of Europe. The two most important elements are closely intertwined, and 
concerned, first, how contemporary Europe is rotting, and, secondly, that the rot implies that 
contemporary Europe is a false Europe. True Europe, on the other hand, is still alive, first and 
foremost in Russia itself, but also in the Russia-friendly European far right movement. 
 
The representation of Europe as ‘rotten’ (gniloy, gnilyushchiy) came back from a 150-year 
long hibernation with a vengeance in the second half of the 2000s. The specific practices that 
were evoked to demonstrate the rottenness were once again sexual in nature. In 1869, 
commenting on the popularity of CanCan and operettas, the populist Mikhaylovskiy was 
reminded of Europe in the days 'when the Popes lived in incestuous relations with their 
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mothers and sisters, and maintained brothels’, and ‘when Roman Caesars had public 
weddings with men’.33 Upon the return, this focus on homosexuality was yet again singled 
out,34 but there was also transsexualism, pedophilia, incest and so on. These practices 
heralded the ‘Decline of Europe’, as an  Izvestia (11 October 2007) headline had it.35 The 
Russian Orthodox church has been particularly active in arguing that only by fighting the 
emerging European norms that accept homosexuality and same-sex marriages can ‘Russian 
civilization contribute to building a peaceful and civilized life on the planet’, as the then 
Metropolitan Kirill put it in 2006.36 Indeed, the Patriarch himself chose this as a main theme 
when he spoke to the Council of Europe the following year.37 President Putin took up this 
representation in 2013 when he stated that Euro-Atlantic countries were undergoing a ‘moral 
crisis’ by ‘implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief 
in God with belief in Satan’, and it has since been part of the state’s representation of 
Europe.38 Once again, as the balance in the debate between liberal and xenophobic nationalist 
views tilted towards the latter, the state followed suit. 
                                            
33 James H. Billington, Mikhailovskiy and Russian populism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 
77. 
34 For a 2007 example, see 'Kakaya-to v derzhave Datskoi gnil'?’, GlobalRus.no, 6 November 2007, 
http://www.globalrus.ru/opinions/784449/news/, accessed 4 Feb 2016; and from 2008, see 'Gomoseksualism 
pokhozh na Rak Obshchestva?', https://otvet.mail.ru/question/12765280, accessed 4 Feb 2016. 
35 See 'Zakat Evropy', Izvestia, 11 October 2007, http://izvestia.ru/news/329597, accessed 4 Feb 2016. For a full 
discussion, Oleg Riabov and Tatiana Riabova (2014) ‘The Decline of Gayropa? How Russia Intends to Save the 
World’ Eurozine, 5 February 2014, available as http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-02-05-riabova-en.html, 
accessed 20 February 2016. 
36 'Ustanavlivat’ ugolovnoe nakazanie za evtanaziyu - nepravil'no, zayiavil mitropolit Kirill', Izvestiya, 4 April 
2006, http://izvestia.ru/news/375872, accessed 4 Feb 2016. 
37 'Patriarkh vseya Rusi [Aleksiy II] prizval PACE ne pooshchryat gomoseksualizm', Izvestiya, 2 October 2007, 
http://izvestia.ru/news/410121, accessed 4 Feb 2016. 
38 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243, 19 September 2013, see also Andrew 
Monaghan ‘A “New Cold War”? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia’, Chatham House 
Russia and Eurasia Programme, May 2015, p. 5; available as 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150522ColdWarR
ussiaMonaghan.pdf. 
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The entire point of the metaphor of rottenness is that there is no future other than 
decomposition. What, then, may come of a rotten Europe? Logically, there can only be one 
answer: Europe has to be restored and renewed. Rotten, decadent Europe is a Europe that has 
left its true character behind. It is a false Europe. What, then, can be more logical than that 
Russia, with its social conservatism, is actually the last true European nation standing, and 
will bring restoration to False Western Europe? This idea of superiority, which was the entire 
basis of Bolshevik views of Europe (true, vital proletarian Europe was chasing out false, 
rotten bourgeois Europe), now came to the fore once again. Gleb Pavlovskiy argued that 
Russia is a ‘better European than Europe itself’.39 Dmitriy Rogozin, then Ambassador to 
NATO, wrote in the nationalist newspaper Zavtra that ‘Russia indeed is also Europe, without 
“gay” rule, pederast marriages, punk mass culture and the lackeying to the United States. We 
are indeed the true Europeans’.40 To Rogozin, the final proof of Europe’s decadence seems to 
be that Europeans see Russians not as European, but as something from outer space, as 
‘cosmonauts’.41  
 
If we ask how this metaphor of Europe as ‘rotten’ returned, we once again run into the main 
xenophobic nationalist, Aleksandr Dugin. In a 1994 book aptly titled The Conservative 
Revolution, he argued that ‘the liberalization of sex, pornography, feminism, homosexuality, 
                                            
39 Gleb Pavlovski, ‘”Rossiya vse eshche ishchet svoy rol” v mire’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 31 May 2004; see also 
Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Finding a civilizational idea’, 394. 
40 Vittorio Strada, ‘Posle imperii: staraya I novaya Rossia’, Vtoraya Nayigatsia: Almanach, No. 10 (Khar’kov: 
Prava Liudiny, 2010). http://library.khpg.org/files/docs/1293605762.pdf., accessed 20 Jan 2016. See also Zavtra, 
“’Est’ i drugava Evropa” (2014), http://zavtra.ru/content/view/est-i-drugaya-evropa; Stephen White and 
Valentina Feklyunina, Identities and foreign policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: the other Europe (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 112-114. 
41 Dimitriy Rogozin, Yastreby mira: Dnevnik russkogo posla (Moscow: Al’pina non-fikshn, 2010), p. 397. 
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and the fashion for Freudianism and psychoanalysis are part of the process of forced 
Westernization of the world. This “era of gynecocracy” heralds the “castration” of men and, 
along with it, the disappearance of traditional society’.42 
 
As noted in the previous section, the xenophobic nationalist representation of Europe was 
forged into a coherent representation from various bits and pieces, most of them gathered 
from Fascist and Communist traditions, by Dugin and others in the turbulent 1990s.43 Under 
Putin, as exemplified by what happened to the official adoption of the representation of 
Russia as ‘True Europe’, it became ever more dominant. In 2012-2013, the state followed up 
on its steady slide towards a xenophobic nationalist position by embracing such a position 
wholeheartedly. One consequence of the state’s shift was actually a further radicalization of 
the xenophobic nationalist representation of Europe. As noted in the introduction to this 
section, key carriers of this representation came out with a critique of the state for not being 
decisive enough in its support of what was for all intents and purposes a war. The state did not 
respond to these calls, but in February 2016, Russia’s Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, 
stated that Russia and the West might be was sliding into ‘a new Cold War’.44 
 
Societal debates do not determine foreign policy moves, but the general tenor of policy 
debates have the effect of making certain moves easier to legitimate than others. It cannot be 
                                            
42 Laruelle, “Aleksandr Dugin”, p. 134. 
43 An authority on Russian nationalism like Verkhovsky even identifies the national ‘mainstream’ as ‘typically 
oriented towards various neo-fascist ideas and racist violence’. Alexander Verkhovsky, ‘Radical nationalists 
from the start of Medvedev’s presidency to the war in Donbass: true till death?’, in Pål Kolstø and Helge 
Blakkisrud, eds., The new Russian nationalism: imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 2000-15 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 76. 
44 As reported worldwide, for example: ‘Russian PM Medvedev says new cold war is on,” 13 February 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35569094, accessed 14 Feb 2016. 
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argued that the societal shift towards xenophobic nationalism somehow caused Russia’s 2014 
annexation of Crimea, its remilitarization, its lingering support for Ukrainian separatists, the 
2016 intervention in Syria or any other specific action in the recent marked shift away from 
cooperation towards confrontation with Europe and the West. By the same token, Adrrei 
Tsygankov may wll be right that ‘although Putin’s rhetoric is indeed increasingly nationalist, 
it is designed more to reach out to traditional critics of the state, than to faithfully follow their 
recommendation’.45 We have no way of knowing. What we do know is that xenophobic 
nationalism and a confrontational foreign policy are mutually reinforcing. In keeping with 
this, 2014 was also the year when the basic xenophobic rejection of Europe was articulated by 
a state organ for the first time since the end of the Cold War. On 10 January 2014, the 
newspaper Izvestiya published the entire text of the Ministry of Culture’s basic draft for an 
overall Russian cultural policy. The document stressed Russia’s uniqueness and vitality, and, 
evoking Russian thinkers like Danilevskiy and Gumilev, but also Arnold Toynbee and Samuel 
Huntington, contrasted it with Europe by stating that Russia ‘must be seen as a unique and 
autonomous civilization which belongs neither to “the West” (“Europe”), nor to “the East”. 
The position may be summed up in a pithy formulation: “Russia is not Europe”’.46 
 
It should be noted, however, that the state did not get the last word on this key formulation. In 
a statement signed by all 27 members of the Scientific Council of the Institute of Philosophy 
at the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Culture’s draft was said not only to be below 
                                            
45 Andrei Tsygankov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s last stand: the sources of Russia’s Ukraine policy’, Post-
Soviet Affairs 31: 4, 2015, p. 295. 
46 Russian Ministry of Culture, ‘Materialy i predlozheniya k proektu osnov gosudarstvennostoy kul’turnoy 
politiki’, printed in Izvestiya 10 January 2014, http://izvestia.ru/news/569016, accessed 5 Feb 2016, p. 3. 
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student level, but to positively false.47 As a result of the critique, the phrase that Russia is not 
Europe was removed from the document. The Russian debate on Europe goes on.  
 
As has been the case since its inception, the Russian debate about Europe is a debate about 
what Russia itself should be. Viacheslav Morozov sums up well what it means at the present 
juncture that Europe is one of Russia’s constitutive outsides when he writes about the 
domestic repercussions of the state’s subscription to the xenophobic nationalism position 
since 2012-2013 that: 
 
the Kremlin’s entire conservative turn comes down to nothing more than an offensive 
against “the fifth column”. This label lumps together all “freaks” – the Pussy Riot 
punk band, NGOs, intellectuals, scholars supported by foreign funding [homosexuals, 
feminists]. They are all stamped as Western collaborators, whose main goal is to 
undermine Russian traditional values. At the same time, the values that are being 
championed tend to recede in the background, while center stage gets occupied by the 
epic fight against forces of evil; for pro-government forces, of whatever stripe, the 
national interest is reduced to anti-Westernism.48 
 
Since this European outside is held to be inferior in the present, there is a rush to demonstrate 
how it was also inferior in the past. In today’s Russia, history is being rewritten on a massive 
                                            
47 ‘Zayavlenie chlenov Uchenogo Soveta Instituta Filosofii PAN o kontseptsii osnov kul’turnoy politike’, April 
2014, http://iph.ras.ru/cult_polit.htm, accessed 5 Feb 2016. I thank Sverre Rustad for directing me to this source. 
48 Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘What is the meaning of “national” in the Russian debate about the national interest?’, 
Policy Memo, Ponars, www.ponarseurasia.org.sites/default/files/policy-
memos:pdf/Pepm414_Morozov_Jan2016pdf. 
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scale, be that in school textbooks, exhibitions or monuments. As it was in Soviet times, it has 
once again become a commonplace to argue that most things European commenced in Russia. 
To pick but one example, Egor Kholmogorov recently argued that ‘Russian national 
consciousness is not younger, but older than the German, French or English one. It is the 
oldest of all European modern nations’.49 In terms of foreign policy, the immediate 
consequence of this shift was confrontation with neighboring Ukraine and an openly 
confrontational policy against the West. 
 
In 1991, the liberal story about Russia and its relationship to Europe ruled the roost. The 
statist text ‘A word to the people’, with which this analysis began, told one of a number of 
other and competing stories. 25 years later, statism has evolved into a xenophobic nationalism 
that dominates the societal debate, and liberals have been marginalized. To give but one 
example, in 2015 former imprisoned oligarch (2003-2013) and present exile Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky argued that the number one priority for Russia should be to get its economy in 
order and that the ‘inevitable’ way to do this would be to integrate Russia with the ‘Euro-
Atlantic world’. If Russia would not ‘Go West’, then it would sink deeper and deeper into 
economic and political isolation. Rather than turning to authoritarianism, Russia should aim to 
join NATO and the EU.50 As will readily be seen, this was basically the state’s position in the 
early 1990s, and in the autumn of 1999, this basically liberal stance would still have been one 
of the two major representations in the debate. 
                                            
49 Egor Kholmogorov ’Rossiya -- rodina mamontov i patriotov’ Russkiy dozor, 10 April 2016, 
http://rusdozor.ru/2016/04/10/rossiya-rodina-mamontov-i-patriotov-egor-xolmogorov/. 
50 Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, ‘Go West: kak vyvesti Rossiyu iz tupika’, PBK, 16 June 2015, 
http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/16/06/2015/557fcfdc9a79477ac18d95bc, accessed 24 Jan 2016. 
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At the present juncture, however, it has become a marginalized view. Igor’ Strelkov, a nom du 
guerre for Igor’ Vsevolodovich Girkin, who had in-depth field experience from various 
theatres and is a mainstay of the Novorossiya movement that works for the expansion of 
Russian state territory, answered by identifying Khodorkovsky as a key fifth columnist.51 
Khodorkovsky’s attempt to ‘help the West once again to destroy what Putin began to rebuild 
in the 2000s’ will not succeed, Strelkov wrote, for ‘God is with us, the Russians!’52 That 
seemed to close the debate. It is not that liberals are all but gone from Russia. Within the state 
apparatus, a liberal party still argues along the same broad lines as Khodorkovsky. Where the 
societal debate is concerned, however, xenophobic nationalism rules the roost. 
 
Back to the Future 
 
What is striking about the debate on Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union, is its centrality 
to Russian political life at large, and the invariance of its positions. When polities exist in 
proximity to one another, they vie for overlapping social space. That spells an imperative to 
keep up, or go bust. In evolutionary theory, this is referred to as the Red Queen Syndrome: 
one has to run in order to stay in the same place.53 This explains why, over the centuries, 
Europe has been what we may call Russia’s main Other: Europe kept producing new ways of 
                                            
51 Igor’ Strelkov, “‘Krugom izmena, trusost’ i obman”: Igor’ Strelkov polemiziruet s Mikhailom 
Khodorkovskim’, Sviobodnaya pressa, 21 October 2014, http://svpressa.ru/blogs/article/101665/, accessed 28 
January 2016. 
52 Strelkov, “‘Krugom izmena’”, 11. 
53 Matt Ridley, The red queen: sex and the evolution of human nature (London: Penguin, 1984). 
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arranging polities, and Russia could not afford simply to neglect this fact. It was forced to 
respond by the very nature of the states system. 
 
If this explains the invariance in focus on Europe, it does not explain the invariance in 
positions. An added factor that goes a long way towards doing this, is a constant within the 
overall Russian debate itself, namely that Russia has to be a great power, or it will be 
nothing.54 What has been at stake in the debate for all participants is not only how to keep up 
with general European developments, but how to do so in a way that will secure Russia's 
standing as a great power. There has been no consensus regarding what it means to be a great 
and glorious polity, with nationalist positions favoring a strong, commanding leader who is 
obeyed simply because he is the leader, and westernizers favoring a deliberative system where 
fair and free elections make up the crucial legitimating mechanism. The Russian debate has 
also had problems with embracing the two subject positions that has been held out to new 
entrants to the European-centered states system, namely those of apprentice and barbarian at 
the gate.55 Rather, these two subject positions have marked the unstable bookends of the 
debate. Statements to the fact that Russia would have to learn from or even go to school with 
Europe, become a normal country, (re)join civilization etc. have been out of synch with the 
underlying premise that Russia must be great or it must be nothing, for Great Powers do not 
go to school. On the contrary, they lay down the line and teach others. By the same token, 
embracing a position as barbarian -- that is, as inferior in the eyes of European great powers -- 
                                            
54 See n. 8 above. 
55 See Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Martin Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to 
the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2000). 
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has largely been out of the question, for such a position rules out being recognized by the 
leading powers of Europe as being on a par with them. The result of the inherent unstableness 
of these two extreme positions is that the debate has largely played itself out in the space 
between them. This largely explains the relative invariance in positions on Europe over the 
centuries. 
 
And yet, there has been variation. How to explain that? If the key underlying factor that drives 
the debate is socially understood backwardness, then it becomes important just how backward 
Russians have understood their country to be, and in which degree it has been understood as a 
handicap or an advantage.56 The more intense the backwardness is felt as a social fact, the 
stronger the urge to catch up with the West. Exceptionally, attempts have even been planned 
to overtake the West (the 1930s would be the primary example of this). An added factor in 
this regard is that the backwardness is experienced differently by different groups in the 
polity. It is not the case that the more well informed by European developments, the more 
acutely aware of the challenge of backwardness. All innovation in representations of Europe -
- be that as something to emulate or something to recoil from -- has been done by elites. It 
holds true, though, that the less informed about developments in the West, the more 
dismissive of the need to take what is happening there into consideration. The result of this 
has been spelled out most eloquently by Yuriy Lotman.57 Elites in Russia and other countries 
which find themselves in a structurally backward position within the states system will 
                                            
56 Alexander Gerschenkron, ‘Economic development in Russian intellectual history of the nineteenth century’, in 
Economic backwardness in historical perspective. A book of essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962).  
57 Yuriy Lotman, Culture and explosion (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, [2004] 2009). 
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periodically try to play catch-up. These attempts will be met with reactions from nationalist 
elites, who will have an easy time mustering broad support from non-elites for resisting 
change in the name of local traditions. The most clear-cut example of this we find in the 1979 
Iranian revolution, but the logic is the same in the Russian case. This logic will also make for 
a regularity in how the state represents the West. In periods when the state embraces a 
westernizing position, it has tended to look to elites for support, while in periods when it has 
embraced a nationalist position, it has looked to non-elites. A clear-cut example of this logic 
can be observed in recent years; at the end of the twentieth century, the state looked primarily 
to big city elites. In the twenty-first century, it has so far leaned increasingly on non-elites. 
 
Choosing non-elites as a base comes at a cost, for elites are by definition the ones that 
implement change and so make for political dynamism and economic growth. If 
backwardness spells an imperative for social change, and social change means emulating the 
West, then closing down elite activity is a guarantee that backwardness will continue, and 
probably even grow. Here we have yet another mechanism that has made for variation. At 
regular intervals – in the twentieth example only, we have the Stalypin reforms of the 1900s, 
the New Economic Policy of the 1920s, the Lieberman reforms of the 1960s, perestroika of 
the 1980s and the reforms of the 1990s -- the state has attempted to play catch-up with the 
West by easing restrictions on economic production. Put differently, it has eked closer to the 
way of thinking about politics that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century, namely that 
the state has to see to it that society produces as much as possible by opening up for civil 
society's self-organization.  
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The basic problem with such a strategy is that, by opening up for new economic agents, new 
political agents may also emerge, for economic power is easily translated into political 
power.58 Since a key tenet of Russian discourse has been that Russia should be a great power, 
and since 'great' has been understood as paternalistic, in the sense of being able to lie down 
the law to other agents, a pluralistic political situation has consistently been seen as a direct 
threat to the strong state.59  This anti-liberal tenet has not only set Russian political thinking 
apart from the broad European tradition. It has also been a key factor in curbing attempts at 
economic reforms. Every time the state has attempted to liberalize economic life, it has 
worked according to intention, in the sense that new economic agents have emerged. As these 
agents have invariably tried to convert their economic resources into political power, 
however, the state has panicked, and closed down the reform.60 As a result, Russian 
backwardness has continued. The latest example of this logic so far came in the 1990s, as the 
state endowed so-called oligarchs. As these oligarchs proceeded not only to innovate, as was 
intended by the state, but also to dominate political life, the state brought them to heel. As 
long as emerging groups of innovators have a narrow social base, this can be fairly easily 
done, and can even be popular. The problem is that the economic backwardness that reform 
and innovation was supposed to curb invariably returns when innovation comes to a halt. So, 
as long as the state cannot tolerate independent bases of power and the social power of these 
bases remains too weak for them to be perpetuated, the basic structural challenge that Europe 
and the West poses to Russia remains the same.  
                                            
58  Easily, not necessarily, as the Chinese experience since 1979 clearly demonstrates. 
59 Lenin referred to this as kto-kogo; who commands whom. 
60 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1987). 
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Conclusion 
 
I began this article by tracing how the Russian societal debate about Europe over the last 
quarter century. I found that the debate has gone from being dominated by a liberal story of 
how Russia should be great by taking its place amongst the leading democratic states of 
Europe, to being dominated by a xenophobic nationalist story of how Russia itself is actually 
True Europe to Western Europe’s False, Americanised and rotten Europe. In the last couple of 
years, this has also been the Russian state’s story about its relationship with Europe. I went on 
to argue that this about-turn is part of a cyclical pattern in Russian history, and that there are 
clear structural reasons why the Russian debate about Europe is characterized by invariance. 
There are also clear structural reasons for the variations that nonetheless exist. These reasons 
spell a cyclical pattern, where periods of westernization alternate with periods of nationalist 
celebration of nativist models for political and economic life. Einstein once defined madness 
as doing the same thing under the same conditions and thinking that the result would be 
different. It follows that, as long as the structural reasons that spell a context of backwardness 
hold -- that is, as long as Russia looks primarily to Western powers for recognition as a great 
power, and as long as some new, alternative way of ordering economic and/or political life 
does not emerge from within Russia itself -- we must expect the cyclical pattern of the 
Russian debate about Europe to continue. 
  
Although China, and in a lesser degree India, are emerging as alternative great powers from 
which to seek recognition as a great power, the point when such recognition would make the 
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recognition of western powers superfluous for Russia to maintain its great power status 
remain a long way off. There are no signs whatsoever that historically new models for overall 
political and economic life are brewing in Russia. A prediction seems warranted. The state's 
position will, before long, change in the direction of westernization. Russia's self-
understanding as a great power demands it. As long as Russia insists on being a great power, 
it will therefore come to pass.  
 
The question to ask, though, is whether the next bout of westernization will break the cyclical 
pattern. The analysis performed here yields a clear answer to this question. The cycle will 
only be broken if one of four preconditions are fulfilled. Two of these preconditions are 
internal and modular: the state sees pluralism as a direct threat to itself and there exists no 
independent social element that can withstand the state's attempts to curb its emergent 
standing as a self-sustaining power base partially independent of the state.  Two are external 
and also entangled with one another: Russia has to relate first and foremost to Western great 
powers rather than non-western ones, and there does not emerge a new international social 
standard for what a great power should be. If one or more of these preconditions do not 
change, then the Russian debate about Europe and the West will remain central to Russian 
political life. It will also retain its cyclical alteration between periods of westernization and 
periods like the present one, when Russia represents Europe as false Europe, and Russia itself 
as true Europe. 
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